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GREENBACKS, CONSENT, AND UNWRITTEN 
AMENDMENTS 
John M. Bickers* 
I remember a German farmer expressing as much in a few 
words as the whole subject requires: “money is money, and 
paper is paper.”—All the invention of man cannot make them 
otherwise.  The alchymist may cease his labours, and the 
hunter after the philosopher’s stone go to rest, if paper 
cannot be metamorphosed into gold and silver, or made to 
answer the same purpose in all cases.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Every day Americans spend paper money, using it as legal 
tender.  Yet the Constitution makes no mention of this 
phenomenon.  Indeed, it clearly prevents the states from having 
the authority to make paper money into legal tender, and does not 
award this power to Congress.2  Yet today, without a formal 
written amendment to the Constitution, America seems united in 
accepting this fact to a degree that greatly exceeds our unity in the 
vast majority of Constitutional questions that might appear.  The 
acceptance by the people today of a power at odds with the 
original meaning of our Constitution offers insights into the 
legitimacy of the process of unwritten amendments to the 
founding document and the continuing meaning of the consent of 
the governed. 
* Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University.
My profound thanks for their suggestions and encouragement go out to Professors Mark 
Graber, Stephen Griffin, and Sanford Levinson, as well as to Richard Albert, Ryan Williams, 
and Yaniv Roznai for including a draft of this paper in their symposium.  I am indebted also 
to the research assistance of Dani Ingram-Farris as well as Mike Mannheimer, Ken Katkin, 
and the rest of my colleagues at the Salmon P. Chase College of Law. 
1. THOMAS PAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON GOVERNMENT, THE AFFAIRS OF THE BANK,
AND PAPER MONEY 44 (1817) (emphasis added). 
2. U.S. CONST. art. I §§ 8, 10.
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I. WHOSE VOICE MATTERS?
A problem has lived long at the heart of originalism.  The 
idea that the Constitution of 1787, whether in the minds of those 
who drafted it,3 or in its meaning to the public of the day,4 should 
control all successive generations fits uneasily with one of the 
core ideas of republican government,5 for if that form of 
government, especially in its American form, has a consistent 
theoretical basis, it is that governmental legitimacy arises “from 
the Consent of the Governed.”6 
Of course, originalism has many defenders, and many foes, 
in the world of legal scholarship.7  This Article will forego all of 
3. Typically this idea is now called “original intent” jurisprudence because it focuses
on the intent the Framers had for their new government.  See, e.g., Jacobus ten Broek, Use 
by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction, 27 
CALIF. L. REV. 399, 399-400 (1939) (noting that the Supreme Court consistently announced 
“that the end and object of constitutional construction is the discovery of the intention of 
those persons who formulated the instrument”).  Not that long ago, what are now described 
as types of originalism tended to be gathered together under the label “interpretivism.”  See, 
e.g. Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 782 (1983) (“Such norms are found by
interpreting the text, with recourse when necessary to the intent of the framers.”).
4. This is often labeled “original public meaning” jurisprudence.  See, e.g., James C.
Phillips et al., Corpus Linguistics & Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to Make 
Originalism More Empirical, 126 YALE L.J. F. 21, 21-22 (2016); see, e.g., H. Jefferson 
Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 935 (1985) 
(“Madison’s interpretive theory rested primarily on the distinction he drew between the 
public meaning or intent of a state paper, a law, or a constitution, and the personal opinions 
of the individuals who had written or adopted it.”).  For the purposes of this Article, the two 
forms of originalism are equally subject to the concerns expressed. 
5. Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside
Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 507 (1994) (noting that “[a] fundamental principle for 
republican government was that the majority should rule”). 
6. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“[T]o secure these
Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent 
of the Governed.”).  At least one modern scholar, though, rejects the view that the 
Declaration’s invocation was meant to require popular governance, instead locating the 
source of the power with those who govern.  See Randy E. Barnett, The Declaration of 
Independence and the American Theory of Government: “First Come Rights, and Then 
Comes Government,” 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 27 (2019) (“It is the matter of ‘who 
governs’ that the Declaration says is to be decided by ‘the consent of the governed.’”).  
7. The battle is both legal and political, but seldom appears in historical scholarship.
See, e.g., ERIC FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING xxiv (2019) (“Whether the courts should 
base decisions on ‘originalism’ is a political, not a historical, question.  But no historian 
believes that any important document possesses a single intent or meaning.”). 
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the routine objections to originalism,8 focusing instead on a 
conundrum closer to the core of the originalist project.  What 
theory of government allows a change to Jefferson’s “self 
evident” principal that the earth belongs to the living?9  Thus, 
originalism has long faced a “dead hand” problem: why should 
the understanding of the Constitution of those long dead bind us, 
their heirs?10  As Professor Moore noted in defending textualism 
from intent-based originalism, such a method has the vice of 
binding us to “old ideals.”11 
As Jefferson was aware, treating the ordering of society as a 
matter to be decided once meant that future generations would 
lose control of their own destiny.12  As he noted to Madison, the 
8. Frequently raised objections to one form of originalism or another include: the
difficulty of reconstructing the beliefs and understandings of a vanished time and the 
variance of opinions among the contemporaries whose views we are seeking, see, e.g., 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
24, 77 (1992) (“[O]ne must plumb the fictional ‘mind’ of a long-dead multi-member body.”); 
see also Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1213 (2008) 
(“[T]here are elements of this lack of historical consciousness in contemporary originalism. 
Judges and scholars speak of the founding generation as if they were our contemporaries.”); 
the utter inability of originalism to deliver on its supposed primary advantage, “an 
interpretive approach that avoided judicial subjectivity, judgment, and choice,” Mark 
Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 616 (2008); or the vastly 
different makeup of “the People” then and “the People” today, see, e.g., Amar supra note 5, 
at 508 (“Women today constitute a majority of both the Massachusetts and American 
polities.  They are today governed under a federal Constitution largely the making of men 
who died long ago, men who may not have had their interests foremost in mind.”).  It has 
even been noted that some difficulties arise from the fact that translations of the Constitution 
into German and Dutch made available in the key states of Pennsylvania and New York did 
not agree.  See Jack M. Balkin, The Construction of Original Public Meaning, 31 CONST. 
COMMENT. 71, 78-79 (2016) (considering a number of possible approaches to the different 
translations, and using them to demonstrate that “articulating the original public meaning is 
not a simple job of reporting what happened at a certain magical moment in time. It is a 
theoretical and selective reconstruction of elements of the past, brought to the present and 
employed in the present for present-day purposes.”). 
9. Thomas Jefferson, II. Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 392, 392 (Julian P. Boyd ed., Princeton Univ. Press 
1958).  
10. Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Originalism’s Dead Hand—in Theory and Practice, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1405 (2009). 
11. Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV.
277, 357 (1985) (“Better that we fill out the grand clauses of the Constitution by our notions 
of meaning (evolving, as we have seen, in light of our developing theories about the world), 
by our notions of morals, and by two hundred years of precedent. . . . The dead hand of the 
past ought not to govern, for example, our treatment of the liberty of free speech, and any 
theory of interpretation that demands that it does is a bad theory.”). 
12. Jefferson, supra note 9, at 392-93.
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logical conclusion was that “no society can make a perpetual 
constitution, or even a perpetual law.”13  Of course, as Madison 
recognized, perpetually remaking the fundamental laws of society 
would make the nation “too mutable” to hold onto its benefits, 
and it might too easily fall victim to “pernicious factions.”14  
Madison’s strongest rejoinder, though, was that the stalwarts of 
the past had not merely lived on the earth; they had improved it, 
and it was perfectly just to find that their successors would be 
obligated to pay the debt of honoring the intentions of those 
whose improvements benefitted the current generation.15  
But Madison declined to find in this principle support for a 
sort of divine right theory of originalism.16  Instead, he returned 
to the consent of the governed, finding a clear path to reconciling 
republican virtue with respect for the improvements of 
preexisting laws: tacit consent.17  As Madison noted, presuming 
the consent of those who participate in a society was the only way 
to avoid either a requirement of unanimity among society’s 
current members or the need to reenact every rule each time a new 
citizen reached the age of majority.18 
As is so often the case, Madison’s common-sense 
philosophy has been incorporated into the sinews of American 
society.  At least when the people do not live in one of the 
revolutionary, government-altering generations,19 they can only 
consent passively, through the ordinary acts that every day 
provide countless opportunities to accept or reject the system of 
government they have inherited.20  Yet this very fact creates a 
13. Id. at 395-96.
14. James Madison, To Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in 13 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, 18, 19 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., Univ. Press of Va. 1981). 
15. Id. at 19-20.
16. See id.
17. “I find no relief from these consequences, but in the received doctrine that a tacit
assent may be given to established Constitutions and laws, and that this assent may be 
inferred, where no positive dissent appears.” Id. at 20 (footnote omitted). 
18. See id. at 21.
19. See, e.g., 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 7-8 (1998).
20. See Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 165, 189 (2008) (“Implied consent is consent to a government as it actually operates: 
if one implicitly consents to the government’s authority, one does so by living under its 
existing rules.  Accordingly, implied consent to the present constitutional regime could only 
establish the propriety of governance based on original constitutional meanings if the 
existing rules of American governance corresponded to such original meanings.”). 
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problem for originalism: what if a widely held current view, one 
receiving a large degree of tacit assent, is wrong from the 
perspective of the 1780s?  Several originalist projects have argued 
that some ideas have just been mistaken over the years, resulting 
in government behavior that is unconstitutional.21  Our obligation, 
proponents of originalism sometimes argue, is to choose one of 
two paths: cease the behavior, or amend the Constitution.22  The 
first generation of originalists included those, like Raoul Berger 
and Robert Bork, who argued that Article V of the Constitution 
provided a fully sufficient response to the “dead hand” problem.23  
Some recent scholars have argued that the fealty to the 
amendment process is critical to the preservation of liberty.24  
Non-originalist scholars have rejected this path, based in some 
measure on the value of the popular consent embodied in the 
Declaration of Independence.25  Many accept fully that the 
21. As an obvious example, scholars in the late twentieth century argued that the then-
current idea that the Second Amendment was not directed to protecting an individual right 
was incorrect, see, e.g., Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 793, 810 (1998); see also Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New
Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1141 (1996) (“Research
conducted through the 1980s has led legal scholars and historians to conclude, sometimes
reluctantly, but with virtual unanimity, that there is no tenable textual or historical argument
against a broad individual right view of the Second Amendment.”). But, c.f., Paul Finkelman,
The Living Constitution and the Second Amendment: Poor History, False Originalism, and
A Very Confused Court, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 661 (2015) (arguing that in adopting an
individual rights view of the Second Amendment, the “Court has embraced a modern
interpretation of the Constitution”).
22. See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611,
619 (1999). 
23. See Siegel, supra note 10, at 1406.
24. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 22, at 654 (noting that a written constitution “is
conducive to preserving the rights of the people from infringement by government officials, 
but only if its original meaning is not contradicted or altered without adhering to formal 
amendment procedures”) (emphasis added). 
25. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97  GEO. L.J. 657, 659 (2009) (“The
proposition that, absent open revolution, we may change an ancient Constitution only 
through the onerous and constitutionally endogenous Article V process is both undemocratic 
and unattractive.”); Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 65 
(2009) (“The grant of an exclusive power to change the constitutional text is logically 
compatible with a practice in which the text’s meaning can change over time.  Judicial power 
to engage in non-originalist constitutional interpretation is simply not tantamount to a 
judicial power of textual amendment.”); Siegel, supra note 10, at 1405 (“The living have not 
assented to Article V as the sole method of constitutional change.  And if we are to construe 
the living as having implicitly consented to any constitutional understanding or arrangement, 
it is to the Constitution as it is currently interpreted, with its many pathways of change.”). 
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Constitution can be, and indeed has been, amended outside of the 
formal amendment process many times.26  Because originalists 
reject in principle these unwritten amendments to the 
Constitution, there would be great value in determining whether 
the actual behavior of the people indicated consent to such an 
unwritten amendment. 
An objector to this framework might argue that the 
description presented of originalism is over-simplistic.  The 
“originalism” described here is the “old originalism,” which has 
been substantially altered by generations of scholars into a “new 
originalism.”27  Some modern originalists have embraced the 
notion that the Constitution as understood at the time of its 
ratification (and subsequent amendments), does not intend to 
answer all modern questions.28  In those areas, it is legitimate to 
recognize space for construction in areas where “original meaning 
will run out as a useful tool for judges needing to resolve the 
case.”29  The existence of the recognition of this “construction 
26. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution
Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1072-73 (1988) (“Unless We the People of the 
1980s can amend our Constitution by a simple majority—a majority of the polity, mind you, 
not of Congress (as I shall explain in more detail below, it is a gross mistake to equate 
Congress with the People)—the Constitution loses its most defensible claim to derive from 
the People.”) (footnote omitted); Professors Balkin and Levinson have located sources of 
unwritten amendments in both partisan appointments to the federal judiciary, see Jack M. 
Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 
1045, 1068 (2001) (“Partisan entrenchment through presidential appointments to the 
judiciary is the best account of how the meaning of the Constitution changes over time 
through Article III interpretation rather than through Article V amendment.”), and through 
the actions of the political branches, administrative agencies, and even lobbying groups and 
think tanks, see Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional 
Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 489, 498 (2006) (“[M]uch constitutional development (and therefore much 
constitutional change) occurs outside of judicial case law.”) [hereinafter Balkin & Levinson, 
Constitutional Change]. 
27. See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 8.
28. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism: The
Conceptual Structure of the Great Debate, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1243, 1248 (2019) (“Second, 
at least some constitutional provisions employ terms that are vague or open-textured; these 
provisions do not provide bright-line rules.  Such provisions create a zone of 
underdeterminacy that allows for doctrinal dynamism consistent with fixed meaning.”). 
29. ERIC J. SEGALL, ORIGINALISM AS FAITH 92 (Cambridge University Press 2018).
Professor Segall notes that some modern originalists have found that the Supreme Court 
decisions guaranteeing marriage equality are correct originalist interpretations of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 178.  As Professor Segall observes, this is “despite the 
unarguable fact that in each of those cases [referring not merely to Obergefell, but also Brown 
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zone,” some might argue, makes my characterization of 
originalism as preventing unwritten amendments nothing but a 
strawman.  
Nonetheless, this Article will persist in using a definition of 
originalism that binds it to the original public meaning of the 
Constitution or the intent of its drafters.30  There are two reasons 
that I believe justify this decision.  The first is that, whatever self-
described originalist scholars may say about their project, the 
public face of the doctrine continues to be one that insists that it 
operates as a real and effective constraint upon judges,31 and 
offers the only real fealty to the written Constitution.32  When 
prominent political leaders,33 public thinkers,34 and members of 
the judiciary35 all purport to subscribe to originalism for these 
principles, it seems fair to cabin discussion of originalism to the 
proclaimed theory and take it seriously as it is used in the public 
square.36 
The second reason for not treating the various schools of 
“New Originalism” is that they are simply too multifaceted to 
v. Board of Education and Lawrence v. Texas] the justices explicitly denied that original
meaning generated the outcomes.”  Id.
30. As will be seen, for the legal tender dispute, there is no difference between the two.
See id. at 92. 
31. NEIL M. GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT 112 (Crown Forum 2019)
(after claiming that originalists are constrained by a “value-neutral methodology” and a 
“closed record of historical evidence,” the Justice warned “[a]llow me to reign over the 
country as a living constitutionalist and you have no idea how I will exercise that fickle 
power.”). 
32. Id. at 25 (“Originalism is simply the idea that when interpreting the Constitution,
we should look to text and history and how the document was understood at the time of its 
ratification”). 
33. See, e.g., Sen. Ted Cruz, Speech to the Federalist Society National Lawyers
Convention (Nov. 18, 2016), [https://perma.cc/X8J8-6RVJ] (describing Justice Scalia as “a 
passionate defender of the Constitution.  Not the Constitution as it has been contorted and 
revised by generations of activist jurists, but the Constitution as it was understood by the 
people who ratified it and made it the law of the land”). 
34. See, e.g., Ed Whelan, Brown and Originalism,  NAT’L REV. (May 11, 2005),
[https://perma.cc/3XK9-E5LG] (calling the “living Constitution” an “Orwellian 
euphemism” whose proponents “absurdly contend that the text of the Fourteenth 
Amendment stating that no state shall ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law’ somehow should be twisted to guarantee rights to abortion and same-sex 
marriage”). 
35. GORSUCH, supra note 31, at 110 (“Originalists believe that the Constitution should
be read in our time the same way it was read when adopted.”). 
36. Indeed, one might argue that old originalism continues to be the public meaning of
the term originalism.  See id. at 110-11. 
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constitute anything more than, as Professor Segall has put it, a 
matter of faith.37  As the disputes about meaning among self-
proclaimed new originalists show, those schools are now 
“indistinguishable from Justice Brennan’s theory of the living 
Constitution.”38 
Constraining the meaning of originalism to the genuine 
public meaning of the written document at the time of its adoption 
allows for a direct test of originalism’s rejection of unwritten 
amendments.  If the theory of this Article is correct, the theory of 
consent of the governed must allow the people today to tacitly 
express their consent to a change that does not appear in the 
Constitution as written and formally amended.39  A test occurs if 
a clear, unwritten amendment to the Constitution has nearly 
universal modern consent.40  If one were to discover a common 
behavior of government that violated the original intent or the 
original public meaning—or both—then the originalist project 
should demand that we end it.41  Scholars have advocated a return 
to constitutional precepts about which the widely popular view of 
today is arguably wrong.42  Areas in question have ranged from 
the serious43 to the satirical.44 
37. SEGALL, supra note 29, at 178 (“There is no theory of originalism that leads to
agreement among scholars and judges about how the Supreme Court should decide cases.”) 
38. Id. at 81.
39. See Griffin, supra note 8, at 1208.
40. Decades ago, Professor Akhil Reed Amar proposed that a source could be found
for unwritten amendments in the triangle of popular sovereignty provisions formed by the 
Constitution’s Preamble and its Ninth and Tenth Amendments, see Amar, supra note 58, at 
492.  
41. See Griffin, supra note 8, at 1187.
42. Raoul Berger, Interstate Commerce: A Response to Sanford Levinson, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 785, 786 (1996) (“[W]e must return to the Founders’ design.  Our duty as scholars is 
to ascertain what they intended, regardless of the Court’s divagations.”); Randy E. Barnett, 
Restoring the Lost Constitution, Not the Constitution in Exile, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 669, 
669 (2006) (“What Restoring the Lost Constitution is really about is restoring various ‘lost 
clauses’ that have gradually been removed from the Constitution by misinterpretation over a 
very long period of time.”). 
43. Examples include the scope of the Commerce Clause, see Berger, supra note 42,
at 786, and the twentieth century administrative state, see Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise 
of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1994).  
44. See, e.g., Jordan Steiker et al., Taking Text and Structure Really Seriously:
Constitutional Interpretation and the Crisis of Presidential Eligibility, 74 TEX. L. REV. 237, 
253 (1995).  For the purpose of this Article, it must be noted that the contest for which this 
was an entry by Professors Steiker, Balkin, and Levinson featured, as its prize, paper money 
as legal tender.  Contest: Was George Washington Constitutional?, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 
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A clear and easy example resides in the purse, the wallet, or 
the pocket of most readers of this Article.  For every bill of United 
States currency, every bit of printed money issued by the 
government contains the phrase “[t]his note is legal tender for all 
debts public and private.”45  And that statement is, whether 
viewed from the perspective of the original intention of the 
Framers or the original public meaning of the Constitution, 
unconstitutional.46 
II. THE ISSUE OF PAPER AS LEGAL TENDER
Because modern use occasionally conflates some of the 
terms important to this discussion, it is important to separate three 
137, 138 (1995) (“First prize in each category is an attractive portrait of Washington himself, 
printed on special green paper . . . .”). 
45. Tamara Kurtzman, Cashing Out, L.A. LAW., Mar. 2019, at 22, 24.
46. Few originalist scholars have attempted to defend paper money as legal tender on
originalist grounds.  But, c.f., Robert G. Natelson, Paper Money and the Original 
Understanding of the Coinage Clause, 31 HARV. J.L. &  PUB. POL’Y 1017, 1079 (2008) 
(basing this power on the express power of Congress to coin money because “the money thus 
‘coined’ did not need to be metallic.  Paper or any other material that Congress selected 
would suffice”).  Professor Natelson makes as compelling a case as can probably be made 
that paper money as legal tender can be fitted within an originalist understanding of the 
Constitution.  To do so, though, he has to find it possible to “coin paper” in the placement of 
a deleted phrase by John Rutledge, id. at 1057; find other references to “coin” that do not 
refer to specie, which he acknowledges are ambiguous, id. at 1061-64; and cite to comments 
of various key figures of the founding alluding to the legitimacy, if not the wisdom, of “paper 
money,” id. at 1078-79.  Ultimately, I reject Professor Natelson’s explanation for three 
distinct reasons.  First, even he concedes that the uses of “coin” for something other than 
specie are uncommon and he notes that the history of colonial uses of material other than 
precious metals as legal tender had not always gone well.  See Natelson, supra note 46, at 
1039 (“[T]he currencies in all four New England colonies performed as poorly as a pessimist 
might expect.”).  Second, his use of “paper money” in, for example, the correspondence of 
Adams and Jefferson, id. at 1078, omits the distinction between paper money and legal 
tender.  Indeed, he refers to the emissions of paper money during the War of 1812 referenced 
in Justice Field’s dissent in Knox v. Lee, id., at 1078 n.340, but those issuances were 
specifically not designated as legal tender.  See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 
637 (1871) (Field, J., dissenting) (“In all of them the issue of the notes was authorized as a 
means of borrowing money . . . and in all of them the receipt of the notes by third parties was 
purely voluntary.”).  Finally, as noted repeatedly during the arguments and opinions of 
Hepburn v. Griswold and Knox v. Lee, Congress had simply never attempted to use this 
power before the mid-point of the Civil War.  See Natelson, supra note 46, at 1019 n.3.  It is 
an odd originalist argument that the ratifiers of the Constitution intended for the federal 
government to have a power, but the government of the day and those for decades after 
simply ignored it despite critical needs during wars and financial catastrophes.  See, infra, 
notes 264-71 and accompanying text.  
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ideas: legal tender, currency, and money.  Legal tender is that 
which is “approved in a country for the payment of debts, the 
purchase of goods, and other exchanges for value.”47  Personal 
checks, for example, are not legal tender; merchants can accept 
them or not as they choose.48  No creditor, though, has the right 
to reject an offer in satisfaction from a debtor provided that it is 
made in legal tender; courts will recognize the debt as having been 
paid.49  Currency, on the other hand, is anything “that circulates 
as a medium of exchange.”50  Issued by banks, governments, or 
even individuals, paper currency in earlier times was generally a 
record of a transaction or promise.51  Third parties might well 
choose to accept it or not, but that choice, as well as the value to 
ascribe to the currency, was just as subject to negotiation as any 
other term between parties.52  That would stop being true if, and 
only if, a government would grant to some form of currency the 
status of legal tender, as legal tender by definition always carries 
the value set by the government.53  Money, as a technical matter, 
is “[t]he medium of exchange authorized or adopted by a 
government as part of its currency.”54  The term “money” was 
generally, but not exclusively, used to refer to something having 
47. Legal Tender, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
48. Genesee Scrap & Tin Baling Co. v. City of Rochester, 558 F. Supp. 2d 432, 436
(W.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[C]hecks are not legal tender in themselves, and cannot lawfully be made 
such by state or municipality fiat.  They may, however, be used as a substitute for legal 
tender, because the payee ultimately has the right to present the check to a bank and redeem 
it for cash in the form of United States currency.”). 
49. Indeed, the modern rule protects tenders that are not legal tender unless the creditor
expresses a contemporary objection to the form of the payment.  See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) 
OF CONTRACTS § 305 (AM. LAW INST 1932) (“[T]ender is made of a valid check or of some 
form of currency which is not legal tender for the purpose, and the tender is rejected without 
a statement that a ground of objection is the medium of payment, the tender is not thereafter 
open to that objection . . . .”).  
50. Currency, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
51. It must be noted that even those destined to lose the struggle over the legal tender
status of paper money agreed that the United States had the authority to issue a paper 
currency.  See, e.g., Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 582 (1871) (Chase, C.J., 
dissenting) (“[W]e do not question the authority to issue notes or to fit them for a circulating 
medium, or to promote their circulation by providing for their receipt in payment of debts to 
the government, and for redemption either in coin or in bonds; in short, to adapt them to use 
as currency.”). 
52. See id. at 582-83.
53. See id. at 583.
54. Money, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
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the status of legal tender.55  Money could originally only be made 
from precious metals.56  This use of coins, though, was 
problematic.  Carrying large amounts of coin could be 
cumbersome, and it left one potentially vulnerable to the 
deprivations of the highwayman.57  
The monetary experience of the colonies during the 
Revolutionary War and as newly independent states operating in 
the Confederation was not a good one.58  With a far greater need 
for resources than their limited money in the form of coins would 
support, colonies issued paper currency of their own, backed by a 
promise to pay.59  The Continental Congress followed suit, and 
large parts of the revolutionary effort were funded through what 
were essentially debt obligations.60  These notes could be 
circulated after their initial issue, but they functioned like any 
other bonds in this status: creditors could choose to accept them 
at less than face value.61  That they did so consistently and 
dramatically accounts for the appearance and persistence of the 
55. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 47.  Because the use of the term varied
then and varies still, this Article will include the phrase “legal tender” where there might be 
any doubt about the intended meaning. 
56. Ali Khan, The Evolution of Money: A Story of Constitutional Nullification, 67 U.
CIN. L. REV. 393, 402 (1999) (“Long before the framing of the Constitution, precious metals 
were used as money in and among markets of the world.  Cheaper metals and raw materials 
were used as money only when precious metals were unknown or scarce.”). 
57. Id. at 411 (“Dealing in hard money was cumbersome and risky, especially in big
transactions that required a heavy amount of gold or silver to be transported to a distant place.  
In such transactions, paper banknotes provided a safe and convenient substitute with a 
considerably low transaction cost.”).  Although the story is an invented one, the film Rob 
Roy locates the source of that outlaw’s difficulties in a robbery that occurs after a subordinate 
accepts payment on his behalf in coin rather than a bank note.  ROB ROY (United Artists 
Corporation 1995).  
58. See, e.g., FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 175 (Univ. Press of Kan. 1985) (describing Rhode Island’s 
issue of “a large amount of unsecured paper currency” as a method of retiring its debt, a 
scheme which helped it gain “the opprobrious sobriquet of Rogue’s Island”). 
59. Rhode Island not only made its notes legal tender for all debts, but disenfranchised
those who would not accept the currency at face value.  See id. at 176 (noting that a relatively 
small number of debtors actually used the legal tender provision when their creditors opposed 
it, but observing that this fact seemed seldom noticed in other states horrified by Rhode 
Island’s actions). 
60. Khan, supra note 56, at 398 (“As the supply of specie was inadequate to conduct
the war, Congress began to issue bills of credit[:] . . . a negotiable promissory note in a bearer 
form so that it could freely circulate as a money-substitute.”). 
61. See Timothy A. Canova, Lincoln’s Populist Sovereignty: Public Finance of, by,
and for the People, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 561, 578 (2009). 
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phrase “not worth a Continental” to describe an item of 
exceedingly small value.62 
In the debates at the Constitutional Convention, as well as 
the language during Reconstruction, it is vital to mind the 
boundaries of these terms.  The key issue for this Article is not 
whether the federal government could issue currency; only a few 
of the Framers sought to prevent that.63  Nor is the question 
whether the federal government could accept paper currency in 
satisfaction for debts it was owed, whether of its own issue or 
not.64  The question for the Framers was whether the new general 
government would have the power recently exercised by Rhode 
Island:65 the power to make paper money not only a useful 
currency but also a legal tender for private transactions.66  Their 
answer was no.67 
III. THE FRAMERS SPEAK: PAPER MAY NOT BE
LEGAL TENDER 
If one’s guiding star for understanding the Constitution is the 
intent of those who drafted it, there are few areas in which that 
intent is as clear as in the question of paper money as legal tender.  
One event demonstrates that intent more clearly than any other: 
the debate over bills of credit.  An early draft explicitly provided 
Congress the power to “emit bills on the credit of the U. States” 
in the power to borrow money.68  In the middle of August, 
Gouverneur Morris rose to move the striking of these words, 
which were designed to allow Congress to issue notes of 
indebtedness that could circulate as currency.69  He warned that 
otherwise the “Monied interest” would oppose the new 
62. Id. (noting that “the general depreciation of the Continental currency” began a
spiral by causing the Continental Congress to have to issue even more paper currency). 
63. See James B. Thayer, Legal Tender, 1 HARV. L. REV. 73, 74 (1887).
64. All creditors always have this power.  See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.)
457, 638 (1871) (Field, J., dissenting). 
65. MCDONALD, supra note 58, at 175.
66. See generally James Madison, Thursday. August 16. In Convention. (1787), in 4
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 219-21 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1903). 
67. Id. at 219, 221-22.
68. Id. at 219.
69. Id.
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Constitution.70  Madison, hoping to protect the power to use 
promissory notes, noted that it should suffice to guarantee that 
such currency could not be made a legal tender.71  Oliver 
Ellsworth responded forcefully that this was “a favorable moment 
to shut and bar the door against paper money.”72  Other Framers 
took their turns denouncing the evil.  James Wilson noted that it 
would be “a most salutary influence on the credit of the U. States 
to remove the possibility of paper money.”73  Pierce Butler argued 
that no European nation had the power to issue paper as legal 
tender.74  Delaware lawyer George Read set the farthest boundary 
for supporting Morris’s proposed amendment by claiming that 
“the words, if not struck out, would be as alarming as the mark of 
the Beast in Revelations.”75  Although the religious views of the 
Framers varied, the fact that a respected elder would compare 
paper money to apocalyptic evil suggested the fervor with which 
the founding generation held this now-unfamiliar view.  The 
motion of Gouverneur Morris passed, and the words were struck 
out.76 
It must be noted that the removal of this language may not 
have accomplished what Madison thought it did.  Generations 
later, Congress would declare that it did have the authority to 
issue paper money as legal tender.77  In considering the effect of 
the Morris amendment on this question, Professor Thayer would 
argue that “the removal of an express grant of power . . . was not 
a prohibition of the power,”78  and it is a powerful justification for 
this view that the text agreed upon in 1787 does include a 
70. Id.
71. Madison, supra note 66, at 219 (“[W]ill it not be sufficient to prohibit the making
them a tender?  This will remove the temptation to emit them with unjust views.  And 
promissory notes in that shape may in some emergencies be best.”). 
72. Id. at 220.  He also noted that preventing Congress from having this power would
win “more friends of influence . . . than by almost any thing else.  Paper money can in no 
case be necessary. . . . The power may do harm, never good.” Id. at 220-21. 
73. Id. at 221.
74. Id.
75. Madison, supra note 66, at 221.
76. Id. at 221-22.
77. See infra, Part VII.
78. Thayer, supra note 63, at 80.
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prohibition regarding a declaration of legal tender by the states.79  
Justice William Strong would later raise this same idea.80  But 
such a textualist approach81 cannot really be squared with an 
ideology that gives primacy to the Framers’ Intent.82  
If one rejects an intentionalist originalism in favor of one 
based on the understanding of those who ratified the new 
Constitution, the rule against paper money as legal tender is no 
less clear.  The other luminaries of the day were almost uniform 
in their hostility to paper money.  The always-essential George 
Washington noted to Rhode Island that its problems stemmed 
from using paper as legal tender and were thus utterly 
foreseeable.83  Thomas Jefferson predicted that a reversal of 
fortune in a place that issued paper money would cause disaster, 
demonstrating that “paper is poverty, that it is only the ghost of 
money, and not money itself.”84  Madison himself, although he 
had originally been uneasy about removing the whole clause that 
Morris objected to, had never been a friend to using paper money 
as legal tender.  Instead he characterized it as unjust, unnecessary, 
and pernicious.85  Even Alexander Hamilton agreed with 
Madison’s characterization that paper money was sinister, 
79. Farley Grubb, The U.S. Constitution and Monetary Powers: An Analysis of the
1787 Constitutional Convention and How a Constitutional Transformation of the Nation’s 
Monetary System Emerged 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 11783, 
2005).  
80. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 546 (1871).
81. Although they are “confused,” see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE:
THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1982), textualism and originalism are by no means the 
same.  See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional 
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 230 (1988) 
(advocating a model that “calls for judges to apply the rules of the written constitution in the 
sense in which those rules were understood by the people who enacted them”). 
82. See Thayer, supra note 63, at 79 (noting that “the majority of the speakers thought
that they were prohibiting bills of credit and paper money.  They were wrong”). 
83. Letter from George Washington to Jabez Bowen (Jan. 9, 1787) in 4 THE PAPERS
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: CONFEDERATION SERIES 504, 505 (W.W. Abbot ed., 1995) 
(“Paper money has had the effect in your State that it ever will have, to ruin commerce—
oppress the honest, and open a door to every species of fraud and injustice.”). 
84. Thomas Jefferson, To Edward Carrington (May 27, 1788), in 13 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, 208, 209 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1956). 
85. James Madison, Notes for Speech Opposing Paper Money (Nov. 1, 1786), in 9 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 158, 158-59 (Robert A. Rutland & William M. E. Rachal ed., 
1975). 
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suggesting at least by 1783 that it was inherently “pregnant with 
abuses.”86  
Less famous members of American society agreed: paper 
money was a horror.  At least one writer of the day argued that 
the Constitution did not go far enough.87  The Anti-Federalist who 
called himself “Deliberator,” argued in 1788 that the Constitution 
would in fact allow the federal government to spawn this horror:  
Though I believe it is not generally so understood, yet 
certain it is, that Congress may emit paper money, and even 
make it a legal tender throughout the United States; and, 
what is still worse, may, after it shall have depreciated in the 
hands of the people, call it in by taxes, at any rate of 
depreciation (compared with gold and silver) which they 
may think proper.  For though no state can emit bills of 
credit, or pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, 
yet the Congress themselves are under no constitutional 
restraints on these points.88 
It must be noted, though, that Deliberator’s view of 
congressional powers was—as is appropriate for an advocate—
extreme.  In addition to claiming that the proposed Constitution 
allowed the issuance of paper money, he envisioned a world in 
which Congress might “if they shall think it for the ‘general 
welfare,’ establish an uniformity in religion throughout the 
United States.”89 
If Deliberator’s understanding of the paper money power 
was not idiosyncratic, one would expect it to a more common 
objection among the Anti-Federalists.  Yet other Anti-Federalists 
do not seem to have pressed this particular attack.90  Far more 
86. Alexander Hamilton, Continental Congress Unsubmitted Resolution Calling for a
Convention to Amend the Articles of Confederation (July 1783), in 3 THE PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 420, 422 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962). 
87. Deliberator, What Congress Can Do; What a State Can Not, in THE
ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS 122 (Morten Borden ed., 1965) 
88. Id. at 125.
89. Id.  Even before the First Amendment’s religion clauses, it is difficult to square the
assertion of this power with the textual guarantee of religious freedom.  U.S. CONST. art. VI 
(“[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust 
under the United States.”).  
90. Indeed, where opposition to the Constitution referred to paper money, it was often
among those few defenders of the practice of granting it legal tender status, who were 
concerned with the explicit prohibition of this power of the states.  See, e.g., PAULINE MAIER, 
RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788, at 246 (Simon & 
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common as an objection from the Anti-Federalists was that 
directed to the explicit ban on the states granting legal tender 
status to paper money.91  “Brutus” argued that the legal tender 
prohibition combined with that on duties and imposts meant that 
“the legislatures of the several states will find it impossible to 
raise monies to support their governments.”92  Luther Martin 
argued that paper money had previously offered “great benefit,” 
and that “it is impossible to foresee that events may not take place 
which shall render paper money of absolute necessity.”93 
Even though Deliberator’s argument was an uncommon one, 
Madison responded to it forcefully.  In the Federalist Papers he 
argued that the use of paper money as legal tender was more 
easily avoided under the Constitution than without it.94  He 
reminded the New Yorkers whose ratification votes he sought that 
the Constitution prohibited the states from ever again using paper 
as a legal tender, and reminded them what “pestilent effects” such 
money had “on the industry and morals of the people, and on the 
character of republican government.”95  As Deliberator might 
well have noted, this passage was in a section specifically 
discussing Article I, Section 10—only a limitation on state power 
was at issue.96  Yet, it is difficult to believe that an advocate like 
Madison would have used such inflammatory language regarding 
paper money if large sections of the public held the view that the 
Constitution gave Congress this very power, while denying it to 
the states.  It is a fair conclusion that the ratifying public 
Schuster 2010) (“Some prominent leaders in the fight against unconditional ratification of 
the Constitution had also fought for paper money in Maryland.  Those affluent freeholders 
were often also debtors, having borrowed money to buy confiscated Loyalist property.”). 
91. See James Philbin, The Political Economy of the Antifederalists, J. LIBERTARIAN
STUD., 79, 88 (1994). 
92. Brutus, “If You Adopt It . . . Posterity Will Execrate Your Memory”, N.Y. J., Oct.
18, 1787, reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 164, 168 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 
1993). 
93. Luther Martin, The Genuine Information VIII, MD. GAZETTE, Jan. 22, 1788,
reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 645, 649 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993).  If 
Martin believed that the federal government had been given this power to offset depriving 
the states of it, he did not say so.  See id. at 645-51. 
94. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(listing “[a] rage for paper money” as an example of the kind of “improper or wicked project” 
less likely to infect the whole United States than any particular state). 
95. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 281 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
96. Id. at 280; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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understood the document the same way that its authors had—they 
believed the Constitution took a position against paper money as 
legal tender.97  This view was widespread and transcended other 
disagreements; a delegate to the Massachusetts ratifying 
convention lamented the decline in virtue and blamed paper 
money and lawful piracy.98  Noah Webster’s defense of senates 
as checks on unwise legislation regretted that the Rhode Island 
senate had proven unable to stop the “rage for paper money,” but 
noted that Maryland’s had, despite the fact that the rage was 
“bordering on madness.”99  Promoters of the Constitution 
frequently decried their opponents as “Paper-Money-men.”100 
The conclusion of the times about the borrowing clause after 
the Morris amendment seems to have been that ascribed to it by 
Madison: it gave Congress the power to issue paper notes, but 
neither that power nor the power to coin money allowed the 
federal government to demand that this paper money be accepted 
by private citizens as legal tender for debts.101  Unless huge 
amounts of contrary evidence have slipped away from the 
97. H.A. Scott Trask, Did the Framers Favor Hard Money?, MISES INST. (Sept. 15,
2003), [https://perma.cc/G2FR-QQZL]. 
98. Mr. Turner, A Sharp Exchange on the Powers of Congress and Its Probable
Corruption, in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST 
SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION 896, 897 
(Bernard Bailyn ed., Library of Am. 1993) (“[T]he operation of paper money, and the 
practice of privateering, have produced a gradual decay of morals . . . .”). 
99. NOAH WEBSTER, A CITIZEN OF AMERICA (Oct. 17, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, 
AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION 129, 132-33 (Bernard Bailyn 
ed., Library of Am. 1993). 
100. See, e.g., TIMOTHY PICKERING, REFUTATION OF THE “FEDERAL FARMER” (Dec.
24, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND 
ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER 
RATIFICATION 289, 295 (Bernard Bailyn ed., Library of Am. 1993) (noting that if there were 
any opponents of the Constitution in New England, they would primarily be “Shayites & 
Paper-Money-men: but their numbers & characters are alike contemptible”). 
101. See Legal Tender Status, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Jan. 4, 2011),
[https://perma.cc/8293-LZZV].  Certainly not germane to the views of all originalists, but 
nonetheless worth noting when considering the public meaning of the Constitution is the 
large chronological leap this Article is about to take.  This gap reflects the fact that there was 
not a single act of Congress making paper money a legal tender between the ratification of 
the Constitution and the Civil War.  See E. G. SPAULDING, HISTORY OF THE LEGAL TENDER 
PAPER MONEY ISSUED DURING THE REBELLION 5-6 (Buffalo, Express Printing Co. 1869).  
The understanding of the ratifying generation seems to have held for the next several 
generations as well. See Natelson, supra note 46, at 1019. 
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historical record, it is difficult to make the argument that 
Congress could grant legal tender status to the paper it printed.102 
IV. THE JUSTICES SPEAK: PAPER MAY NOT BE
LEGAL TENDER 
Mrs. Hepburn owed Mr. Griswold $12,720.103  She had 
taken out a loan from him, and the principal plus interest 
amounted to that sum in the spring of 1864.104  Haled into 
Chancery Court in Louisville, Kentucky, Mrs. Hepburn offered 
the full sum in the form of paper money—”greenbacks”105—
printed by the United States government.106  Mr. Griswold 
refused, as the loan had been made in coin,  he demanded coin in 
return.107  Mrs. Hepburn then paid the court in paper money, the 
court accepted the offer pursuant to an 1862 Act of Congress, and 
the court dismissed Griswold’s lawsuit.108  His appeal was 
granted by a Kentucky court and Mrs. Hepburn then elevated the 
case to the United States Supreme Court.109 
Many events conspired to make the case of more interest 
than the sum of money would suggest.  The notion that paper 
could be accepted in payment of debts was not new; indeed, for 
hundreds of years some people had preferred paper to coin.110  But 
in 1862, Congress took a step beyond the conventional thinking 
that the Constitution barred it from making true paper money.111  
While authorizing a large issue of paper currency, Congress made 
the greenbacks legal tender for all debts, public and private.112  
102. Trask, supra note 97.
103. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 605 (1870).
104. Id.
105. So called because of the green-colored ink with which they were printed.  See G.
Edward White, Reconstructing the Constitutional Jurisprudence of Salmon P. Chase, 21 N. 
KY. L. REV. 41, 67 (1993). 
106. See Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 605.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.  The Court initially heard argument in the 1867 term, but reheard it the
following year to allow the United States Attorney General to be heard on this matter of 
“great public importance.” Id. at 605-06. 
110. See White, supra note 105, at 64.
111. Legal Tender Act, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 345, 345 (1862).
112. After setting forth the authorization to the Treasury to issue non-interest bearing
notes and to accept them in payment of taxes and duties owed to the United States, the law 
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The Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase, was ambivalent 
about the legal tender provision, but desperately needed the 
authorization for these new notes.113  When he received that 
authorization, he set to work using it to fund the war effort critical 
to the survival of the nation.114  The Treasury Department even 
put the face of its Secretary on some of the notes.115 
By 1869, when Mrs. Hepburn’s suit reached the highest 
court in the land, Salmon P. Chase had become the Chief 
Justice.116  An observer might guess that he would lead the Court 
into a decision upholding the authority of Congress to make legal 
tender, even for preexisting debts, of the paper currency for which 
he had been responsible and which was now quite popular.117  
That observer would be wrong.118 
A Court intent on limiting the powers of Congress might 
have adopted a harsh and text-limited view of the Article I 
powers.119  After all, not one word of Section 8 granted Congress 
the right to set legal tender for the country.120  Such an opinion, 
added that the notes “shall also be lawful money and a legal tender in payment of all debts, 
public and private, within the United States.”  Legal Tender Act, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 345, 345.  
113. See Randy E. Barnett, From Antislavery Lawyer to Chief Justice: The Remarkable
but Forgotten Career of Salmon P. Chase, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 653, 674 (2013). 
114. Roger D. Billings, Jr., Book Review, 29 AKRON L. REV. 469, 469 (1996)
(reviewing JOHN NIVEN, SALMON P. CHASE, A BIOGRAPHY (1995)) (“Chase kept Lincoln’s 
government afloat with greenbacks.”). 
115. DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS: THE POLITICAL GENIUS OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 510 (Simon & Schuster 2005) (Chief Justice Chase “was also pleased 
by the fact that his own handsome face would appear in the left-hand corner of every dollar 
bill”).  
116. President Lincoln had considerable doubts about Chase’s ambition but put them
aside to nominate his Treasury Secretary to be the new Chief Justice after Roger Taney’s 
death.  See id. at 679-80 (citing Lincoln’s response to Chief Justice Chase’s opponents that 
he knew of Chase’s schemes but “I should despise myself if I allowed personal differences 
to affect my judgment of his fitness for the office”). 
117. Indeed, a post-war economic boom had significantly decreased the opposition to
paper money that had been present only a few years earlier.  See IRWIN UNGER, THE 
GREENBACK ERA: A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN FINANCE, 1865-1879, 
at 165 (1964) (opponents of paper money “who would later regain their hard money fervor 
were to be strangely blind to the failings of paper money during the bonanza years”). 
118. Id. at 174.
119. See Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 628 (1870) (Miller, J. dissenting)
(“[T]here have been from time to time attempts to limit the powers granted by [the 
Constitution], by a narrow and literal rule of construction . . . .”); see also United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (narrowing the Court’s interpretation the Commerce Clause, 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, to limit Congress’s power to regulate firearms). 
120. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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to those who opposed it, would resemble the bizarre formalism of 
the territorial governance portion of Chief Justice Taney’s 
opinion in Scott v. Sandford.121  It would have been sufficiently 
removed from the reality of mid-nineteenth century governance 
that critics could simply brush it aside later.122 
Chief Justice Chase did no such thing.  Rather than reject a 
limited view of Congressional power, he deliberately sought out 
the most famously expansive version of those powers, the one set 
forth by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland.123  In 
defending the constitutionality of Congress chartering a national 
bank, the unanimous McCulloch Court had created a test that, 
while paying lip service to the notion that Congress had limited 
powers,124 nonetheless preserved a broad sense of federal 
supremacy.125  John Marshall had established a test that required 
only that the Constitution furnish a goal; Congress itself could 
choose any measure of seeking to attain that goal, provided only 
that it was a reasonable way of reaching toward it and it was not 
specifically prohibited.126  This test, still relied on in the vast 
majority of tests of congressional power, is apparently broad 
enough to allow Congress to continue to incarcerate people after 
the completion of their judicially imposed sentences.127  One 
Justice in recent years went out of his way to characterize the 
McCulloch test as “permissive.”128 
121. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 436 (1857).
122. See United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 790-91 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No.
16,151). 
123. Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 614 (describing the test set forth in the permissive
McCulloch case as one that “has ever since been accepted as a correct exposition of the 
Constitution”). 
124. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) (recognizing that the
federal “government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers”). 
125. Id. (“[T]he government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme
within its sphere of action.”). 
126. Id. at 421 (“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution,
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not 
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”). 
127. United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 129-30 (2010).
128. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 564 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“[P]rincipally for reasons of stare decisis, I shall henceforth apply the permissive 
McCulloch standard to congressional measures designed to remedy racial discrimination by 
the States.”). 
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But even such a permissive test, in the hands of Chief Justice 
Chase, sufficed to prevent Congress from making paper currency 
a legal tender for private debts.129  Chase reminded his listeners 
of the McCulloch test, noted also that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause lacked a requirement that the act of Congress be 
“absolutely necessary”, and added that money required a standard 
of value that could only be set by governments.130  He 
acknowledged that the Constitution expressly vested that very 
standard-setting power in the legislature.131 
The Court then found, though, that no enumerated power 
offered a sufficiently clear goal to allow the same power to exist 
regarding paper as legal tender.132  Using logic, the opinion 
quickly ruled out the power to coin money,133 the war power, the 
power to regulate commerce, or the power to borrow funds.134  To 
find a power to make legal tender out of paper from one of these 
sources, the Court held, would “convert the government, which 
the people ordained as a government of limited powers, into a 
government of unlimited powers.”135  
Even though the first third of the McCulloch test was thus 
found to have been failed, the Court proceeded to find that making 
paper into legal tender was not a reasonable means in any 
event.136  The Court had earlier noted a “well-known law of 
currency” guaranteeing that paper would never be at face value 
unless it was convertible into specie “promptly . . . at the will of 
the holder” of the paper.137  It argued that adding the legal tender 
requirement did nothing to improve the success of the notes.138  It 
held that any benefit that might accrue from compelling the 
acceptance of paper would be more than offset by “the 
derangement of business,” inflation, and an accompanying “long 
129. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 625 (1870) (concluding that the legal
tender acts failed the McCulloch test in multiple ways). 
130. Id. at 615.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 616.
133. Id. (“It is certainly not the same power as the power to coin money.”).
134. Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 617.
135. Id. at 618.
136. Id. at 622.
137. Id. at 608. Thus, the Court concluded that only coined specie had real value, and
that paper currency could never be more than a mere placeholder for it. 
138. Id. at 620 (citing for this proposition “eminent writers”).
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train of evils.”139  Such a means was not “appropriate and plainly 
adapted” to the Constitution’s purposes.140 
Finally, the Court turned to the observation of Chief Justice 
Marshall that the means chosen by Congress “must be not 
prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the 
Constitution.”141  To find the spirit of the Constitution, Chief 
Justice Chase looked, in the style of an originalist, to the words 
and behavior of the framing generation.142  Anticipating the 
discussion still ongoing between the original intent and public 
meaning schools, he based his findings on the intent of both 
“those who framed and those who adopted the Constitution.”143  
He discovered their opposition to the use of paper as money in the 
prohibition of the impairment of contracts,144 the requirement that 
private property not be taken without just compensation,145 and 
the due process protection of property.146  It is difficult not to 
smile a little at Salmon P. Chase’s proffered self-defense over the 
fact that a former Treasury Secretary who oversaw this very 
change was authoring the very opinion announcing that the 
change had been unconstitutional.147  It is much more difficult, 
though, to argue that he was wrong as a matter of either textual 
logic or the original intent (or public meaning) of the 
Constitution.148  
Not everyone agreed with the outcome of the case: Justice 
Miller was joined by two other Justices in dissenting.149  Yet their 
dissent does not demonstrate that the Chief Justice was wrong 
about the text or the original meaning of the Constitution.150  On 
139. Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 621.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 622.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 623.
144. Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 623.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 624.
147. Id. at 625 (“[A]mid the tumult of the late civil war . . . different views, never
before entertained . . . were adopted by many. . . . If power was assumed from patriotic 
motives, the assumption found ready justification in patriotic hearts . . . .”). 
148. Id. at 625-26.
149. Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 626 (Miller, J., dissenting).  Justices Swayne and
Davis, both appointed by President Lincoln, joined the dissent.  Id. 
150. See id. at 626-39.
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the contrary, they simply showed less concern for the text of the 
Constitution than the majority had, and none whatsoever for the 
original meaning of that document.151 
As to the former, the best argument Justice Miller could 
summon was that the Constitution prohibited the states from 
making anything but gold or silver a lawful tender, but had no 
such prohibition upon Congress.152  Indeed, this fact, especially 
in conjunction with Congress’s power to coin money, might be an 
arguable textual source for the paper money power, but not even 
Justice Miller could find that power located there.153  
Ultimately Justice Miller relied on the war power.154  He 
found that the Civil War’s unparalleled destruction brought with 
it the necessity for Congress “to devise some new means of 
borrowing money on the credit of the nation.”155  This openly 
non-originalist argument focused on the risk of a shortage of 
capital that might have brought on the loss of the Civil War, the 
division of the country, and the impoverishment of the people.156  
Justice Miller expressed his certainty “[t]hat the legal tender act 
prevented these disastrous results.”157  Without the legal tender 
requirement, he maintained, the notes of the United States would 
have sunk “to the dead level of worthless paper.”158  In short, the 
necessity of the war allowed for the appearance of a wholly new 
power.159  
That this was an extraordinarily non-originalist approach 
appeared as a concession when Justice Miller spoke about the 
governing officials who had ultimately passed the 1862 and 1863 
Acts.  He observed about them that they “had been trained in a 
school which looked upon such legislation with something more 
than distrust.”160  Indeed, that American society had continued the 
founding generation’s view of the evils of paper as money is 
151. See id.
152. Id. at 627.
153. Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 627.  But, c.f., Natelson, supra note 46, at 1079.
154. Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 632.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 632-33.
157. Id. at 633.
158. Id. at 634.
159. Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 633-34.
160. Id. at 634.
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evident in nearly every line of both the majority and the dissent.  
Chief Justice Chase’s opinion carried with it the regret that better 
judgment was not exercised by those with “patriotic hearts.”161  
Justice Miller in response embraced the idea of paper as legal 
tender as one that had been received during the Civil War “with 
almost universal acquiescence.”162  In other words, for him it 
simply did not matter what the founding generation thought—the 
fact was that the dissenters agreed with the government and the 
people of their own time who found the law to be “a necessity in 
the most stringent sense in which that word can be used.”163 
But the dissenters were outvoted.164  The Court had spoken.  
The Congress of the United States was without authority to make 
paper currency into a legal tender for all debts, public and 
private.165 
V. THE PEOPLE SPEAK: PAPER MAY BE LEGAL
TENDER 
The assassination of Abraham Lincoln shook the body 
politic of the United States.166  The efforts of his successor to 
prevent meaningful societal change in the newly readmitted 
former confederacy led to his impeachment, which was another 
unprecedented moment for the nation.167  The campaigns of 
revanchist violence that savaged the African-American 
population of those states tore at the fabric of the country as 
161. Id. at 625 (majority opinion).
162. Id. at 638 (Miller, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 635.
164. Some controversy remains whether the decision should be thought of as 5-3 or 4-
3. As Chief Justice Chase noted in his opinion, Justice Grier voted with the majority, but
retired from the Supreme Court before the decision was ultimately announced.  Hepburn, 75
U.S.(8 Wall.) at 626 (majority opinion); see, infra, notes 176-84 and accompanying text.
165. See Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 626.
166. JAY WINIK, APRIL 1865: THE MONTH THAT SAVED AMERICA 259 (2001) (calling
the events surrounding the assassination “a time when the institutions of American 
democracy faced perhaps their greatest test”). 
167. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-
1877, at 333 (1988) (“[T]o the many dramatic innovations Reconstruction brought to 
American politics, the spring of 1868 added yet another: the unprecedented spectacle of the 
President’s trial before the Senate for ‘high crimes and misdemeanors’”). 
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well.168  All of these events were widely fretted over at the time.169  
Compared to them, the battle over paper money as legal tender 
was small.  Yet it too upset the natural political order, and it too 
led to significant changes in the United States.170 
The long-term advocates of paper money never treated 
Hepburn v. Griswold as the last word on the subject.171  Indeed, 
it could not be.  Although the opinion was technically limited to 
the repayment of debts contracted before the Legal Tender Act, 
not one word of Chief Justice Chase’s opinion regarding the 
power of Congress made an analysis of debts contracted after the 
Act any different.172  After all, the Court had invoked the 
“permissive”  language of McCulloch in finding that paper money 
was beyond the power of Congress.173  If the federal government 
lacked the power to make paper money legal tender, the 
awareness of the parties that the government claimed this power 
should make no logical difference.  There might be more 
sympathy for the creditor whose expectations of specie repayment 
were dashed than one who knew beforehand that greenbacks 
would repay any debt.  Sympathy for the wronged, though, cannot 
be the basis for congressional power—at least not if the idea of 
congressional power is that it has any limits at all.  Opposition to 
the decision seemed to understand that it could not be cabined to 
pre-1862 debts.174 
168. Id. at 425 (“[T]he wave of counterrevolutionary terror that swept over large parts
of the South between 1868 and 1871 lacks a counterpart either in the American experience 
or in that of other Western Hemisphere societies.”). 
169. See UNGER, supra note 117, at 163.
170. The magnitude of Hepburn upsetting of the political order was not immediately
apparent, possibly because the holding explicitly concerned only legal tender for debts that 
predated the 1862 act.  See id.117 at 176 (noting that because of this limitation “[o]nly long-
term obligations of states, municipalities, and—among business firms—railroad 
corporations, together totaling some $350 million, were involved”). 
171. See 6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, at 691 (1971) (“Greenbackers became 
a force in politics.”). 
172. See id. at 705.
173. See, supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text; id. at 703-04.
174. Sidney Ratner, Was the Supreme Court Packed by President Grant?, 50 POL. SCI.
Q. 343, 346 (1935) (noting “[a] powerful movement in Congress and among the masses”
against the decision).
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In the words of the Boston Daily Advertiser, “there is little 
disposition to accept [the Hepburn decision] as final.”175  Because 
of a fluke of timing, opposers would not have to.  Efforts to 
prevent President Andrew Johnson from replacing Justices had 
reduced the Court to eight, and it was on its way to seven.176  
Almost a year before the Hepburn decision, Republicans had 
become convinced that the election of Ulysses Grant had defeated 
Johnson’s program for the nation just as thoroughly as the 
victories of Ulysses Grant had defeated Lee’s program for 
secession on the battlefield.177  To increase Grant’s ability to 
affect the Court, they passed an act in April 1869 that affected the 
size of the Court in two ways.  On the one hand, it restored the 
size of the Court to nine; at the same time, it provided an incentive 
for new vacancies to appear through judicial retirement, as any 
Justice over seventy years of age who had already served for at 
least ten years would receive his salary for life if he retired any 
time after that December.178  When Justice Grier retired, as 
Congress had no doubt hoped, President Grant suddenly had the 
opportunity to remake the Court with two appointments.179  
Scholarly opinions have varied over the generations about 
the extent to which the change in personnel of the Court was 
deliberately related to the Hepburn decision.  Defenders of the 
President, most notably former Attorney General Hoar, argued 
that the selections were made before the decision came out; they 
were delivered to the Senate the day of the decision, but the 
selections of William Strong and Joseph Bradley preceded the 
knowledge that the Court would rule against the constitutionality 
175. FAIRMAN, supra note 171, at 767.
176. See David P. Currie, The Reconstruction Congress, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 383, 432
(2008) (“Congress had provided that until deaths or resignations reduced the number of 
Supreme Court Justices from nine to seven, no vacancies on that tribunal should be filled.”). 
177. Josh Chafetz, Unprecedented? Judicial Confirmation Battles and the Search for
a Usable Past, 131 HARV. L. REV. 96, 123 (2017) (“One of the first laws signed by President 
Grant in 1869 expanded the Supreme Court back to nine Justices . . . .”). 
178. FAIRMAN, supra note 171, at 716-17 (noting that the other Justices of the Court
gave Justice Grier their “unanimous view” that he should retire, which he agreed to do with 
an effective date of the end of January 1870). 
179. It might have been three, as Justice Samuel Nelson, like Justice Robert Grier, met
the statutory requirements for the full-pay retirement.  Id. at 716.  Nelson did not retire until 
1872.  Id. at 657. 
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of paper money.180  Unfortunately for the Hoar defense, the 
memoir of Treasury Secretary George Boutwell revealed that the 
Chief Justice warned him of the Hepburn decision before its 
release; as a former Secretary of the Treasury, Chase was 
concerned about the possibility that the decision would cause a 
run on gold.181  Scholars have long noted that the view of the 
question taken by the two nominees was likely known to the 
president—Justice Strong had even ruled in favor of paper as 
legal tender when he was a justice on the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court.182  This Grant never denied; he would say only that he did 
not “exact anything like a pledge or expression of opinion from 
the parties he might appoint to the Bench.”183  Ultimately, 
Professor Fairman’s view seems sound: even if President Grant 
had as a key criterion for selecting Justices a confidence that they 
would overturn Hepburn, use of such criteria was not 
inappropriate.184  
But the confidence that Hepburn was not a final settlement 
was not merely based on the make-up of the Court.  In embracing 
the call for a rehearing, the Boston Daily Advertiser focused on 
the practical impact of the decision, which was “much greater 
than its defenders admit.”185  Writing of the decision as if it were 
the sort of executive action that might be readily reversed, the 
Advertiser warned of a great evil “if the decision is 
maintained.”186  Actions by a diverse and widespread group of 
interests showed that they continued to view paper money as legal 
tender, the opinion of the United States Supreme Court 
notwithstanding; some state government authorities announced 
180. Ratner, supra note 174, at 349.
181. Id. at 352.
182. Id.; Shollenberger v. Brinton, 52 Pa. 9, 56-71 (1866) (Strong, J., dissenting).
183. Ratner, supra note 174, at 351.
184. See Charles Fairman, Mr. Justice Bradley’s Appointment to the Supreme Court
and the Legal Tender Cases, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1128, 1133 (1941) (noting that if President 
Grant knew about the outcome of Hepburn in advance he doubtlessly “regarded the decision 
as profoundly wrong, and nominated judges whose opinions, according to the best 
information available, he approved.  Would anyone in his place have done otherwise?”). 
185. FAIRMAN, supra note 171, at 767.
186. Id. at 767-78.
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that they would continue to accept paper money187 and some 
private corporations, especially railroad interests, announced that 
they would pay their debts in paper money.188  
The decision’s opponents would prove to be correct; in just 
over a year, the Court would again involve itself in the 
controversy.  The additions of Justices Bradley and Strong proved 
vital to the reconsideration of the constitutional issue.  Harper’s 
Weekly, which supported paper money as legal tender, noted that 
the new decision, Knox v. Lee, was not a normal constitutional 
decision: “except for certain political hopes and expectations that 
opinion would probably not have been rendered.”189 
VI. THE JUSTICES SPEAK AGAIN: PAPER MAY
BE LEGAL TENDER 
Only one year after the critical decision in Hepburn v. 
Griswold, a supplicant asked the Supreme Court to consider the 
legal matter again.190  This time, the occasion was the sale of a 
herd of sheep owned by a Pennsylvanian named Mrs. Lee that 
found itself in Texas upon the outbreak of hostilities.191  The 
Confederacy seized and sold the sheep to a Mr. Knox.192  After 
the war, Mrs. Lee’s lawsuit against the buyer for conversion took 
a constitutional turn when she sought to introduce evidence that 
the greenbacks in use at the time were less valuable than the gold 
and silver specie with which the sheep had originally been 
valued.193  The trial court declined to admit such evidence, but 
reminded the jury at the end that their decision regarding the 
amount of the damages could take into consideration that Mr. 
187. Id. at 768-69 (citing a Maine resolution and a decision by a Pennsylvania State
Fund, although the latter was overturned by a state statute requiring the state treasurer to 
comply with the Supreme Court decision). 
188. Id. at 769-70 (offering examples of resolutions to use paper money but pay the
difference between them and their gold value in one case “if the present decision of the 
Supreme Court of the United States is not reversed within a year”). 
189. Id. at 766 (adding somewhat sadly that the Supreme Court was “not free from the
soliciting whispers of political ambition”). 
190. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871).
191. Id. at 457.  In the Legal Tender Cases, Knox v. Lee was paired with Parker v.
Davis, a case from Massachusetts involving a sale of land.  Id. at 461-62. 
192. Id. at 457.
193. Id. at 458.
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Knox could pay any judgment “in legal tender notes of the United 
States.”194  Mr. Knox complained that this instruction increased 
the amount of damages, and took the case to the Supreme 
Court.195 
The Court he faced consisted of nine Justices, including 
seven that decided the Hepburn case.196  These seven Justices 
split precisely along the lines they had the previous term.197  The 
four remaining members of the Hepburn majority held to their 
view that the Constitution did not allow for the making of paper 
money into a legal tender.198  They were now a dissenting 
minority, though, as the three dissenters from the previous battle 
were joined by the two newly appointed Justices in finding that 
the Constitution imposed no barrier at all to such legislation.199  
The claims and counterclaims of the opinions—two for the 
majority and three for the dissent—speak loudly about the 
theories of constitutional governance offered by both sides.200  
For in overturning a one-year old case, the Court did not use some 
of the classic approaches for such changes of direction: the 
application of the law was misguided,201 we know more now than 
we did then,202 or we are not actually changing anything.203  This 
time, the court simply came to a different conclusion based on a 
194. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 458.
195. Id. at 459.
196. See id. at 603-04 & n.158 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
197. Compare id. at 529, 554 with Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 606,
626 (1870). 
198. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 529; Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at
606. 
199. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 529, 554; Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) at 626 (Miller, J., dissenting); Gerard N. Magliocca, A New Approach to 
Congressional Power: Revisiting the Legal Tender Cases, 95 GEO. L.J. 119, 144-45 (2006). 
200. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 529, 554, 570, 587, 604, 634.
201. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 643 (1943) (Black
& Douglas, JJ., concurring) (explaining their change in vote from the previous Gobitis case 
because “[l]ong reflection convinced us that although the principle is sound, its application 
in the particular case was wrong”). 
202. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ. 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (considering the
previously rejected claim that segregation did not cause feelings of inferiority but noting that 
“[w]hatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. 
Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority”). 
203. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873
(1992) (rejecting the trimester framework while simultaneously reaffirming the “central 
holding” of Roe v. Wade). 
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different vote.  Indeed, the majority went to some lengths to 
suggest that overturning a case was not a particularly unusual 
event.204  That is especially so, the majority noted, when the court 
deciding the previous opinion was smaller than some thought it 
ought to have been.205  
Newly appointed Justice Strong delivered the majority 
opinion.206  His pronouncement was an overtly prudentialist 
one.207  Moments into his opinion he observed that a decision 
striking down the legal tender status of paper money would lead 
to “great business derangement, widespread distress, and the 
rankest injustice.”208  Such a statement might have been 
hyperbolic, but it would at least have been legitimate as the 
observation of a Court that was considering a new issue and 
writing on a blank slate.  But the Knox Court had no such blank 
slate: the same Court in the same chambers had struck down just 
such a law only a year before.209  To warn of the consequences of 
an unprecedented decision is one thing; to warn of the 
consequences of merely reaffirming a recent precedent makes 
considerably less sense.  This is especially true when those 
consequences are external to the actual record in the case.210  
Having signaled the Court’s approval of paper as legal 
tender, Justice Strong then proceeded to explain how the Court 
considered the matter.211  Unsurprisingly, the majority relied on 
204. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 554 (“[I]t is no unprecedented thing in
courts of last resort, both in this country and in England, to overrule decisions previously 
made.”). 
205. Id. at 553-54.
206. Id. at 529.
207. See BOBBITT, supra note 81, at 61 (“Prudential argument is constitutional
argument which is actuated by the political and economic circumstances surrounding the 
decision.”). 
208. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 529.
209. Id. at 553; Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 625 (1870).
210. Modern discussions of the dangers of overturning precedent have generally
included reliance interests. See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792-93 (2009) 
(“Beyond workability, the relevant factors in deciding whether to adhere to the principle of 
stare decisis include the antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interests at stake, and of 
course whether the decision was well reasoned.”).  Whatever the new majority thought of 
the reasoning of the decision, it is surprising to see a reversal of a precedent couched in a 
claim for stability.  See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 529. 
211. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 547.
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McCulloch, just as all the Justices had in the previous term.212  But 
if Justice Strong used a similar approach to that of Justice Miller 
in Hepburn, it was different in a particularly significant way.  For 
Justice Miller, the legitimate ends provided by the Constitution 
for the first prong of McCulloch had arisen from the war power.213  
For Justice Strong, in what may have been a bit of foreshadowing, 
no such reliance on the single war power was necessary.214  
Instead, Justice Strong found that the ends provided by the 
Constitution need not come from any single enumerated power; 
indeed, the goal in question might “be deduced fairly from more 
than one” enumerated power, or even “from them all 
combined.”215  In language somewhat prescient of that which 
Justice Douglas would later use to locate the source of the right 
to privacy,216 Justice Strong concluded that a court might “group 
together any number of them and infer from them all that the 
power claimed has been conferred.”217  
Moving to the second part of the test, the Court denied that 
the relationship of Congress’s means to the constitutional end 
need be “direct and immediate.”218  To determine that 
relationship, in this case, he again turned to its consequences.219  
If the legal tender laws had demonstrated their efficacy by saving 
the nation, how could they be called unreasonable?220 
The final step, that of showing that the laws did not conflict 
with the Constitution’s letter or spirit, proved no more a barrier 
for the Court than the first two steps.221  As to the letter, Justice 
Strong used logic to demonstrate that the power to coin money 
did not limit the ability to issue paper notes and declare them legal 
212. This was a feature of all the legal tender cases.  See Magliocca, supra note 199,
at 124 (“Despite their differences in result, all three cases relied on McCulloch and each 
claimed that it was the best reading of Marshall’s work.”). 
213. See Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 631-32 (Miller, J., dissenting).
214. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 534.
215. Id.
216. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (“The present case, then,
concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental 
constitutional guarantees.”). 
217. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 534.
218. Id. at 543.
219. See id. at 541-43.
220. Id. at 541.
221. See id. at 544-53.
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tender.222  After all, Congress was only empowered to punish a 
small group of crimes in the Constitution, yet it criminalized 
much other behavior, often with McCulloch as its guide.223  
Justice Strong did the same by reversing the previous majority’s 
assumption regarding the prohibition of states from making paper 
a legal tender: “when one of such powers was expressly denied to 
the States only, it was for the purpose of rendering the Federal 
power more complete and exclusive.”224  
The spirit of the Constitution he identified with the 
prohibition of the impairment of contracts.225  Yet this too the 
Court rejected as the source for a possible limitation on 
Congress.226  Expanding beyond the limited exception of the 
Bankruptcy Clause, Justice Strong concluded that state law 
governed contracts for the delivery of goods, but that federal law 
was supreme in the area of contracts for money payments.227  He 
used the fluctuation in the weight of gold coins of the United 
States to illustrate that this power resided in Congress.228  
It is worth pausing a moment to consider the meaning of the 
Strong McCulloch test for federal power.229  The opinion pays 
even less homage than McCulloch itself to the notion that the 
federal government is one of limited and defined powers; instead, 
it substitutes a strong sense of deference to a co-ordinate federal 
branch.230  In determining whether Congress had exceeded its 
limits, the Court now held that: (1) the Constitution provides the 
goals of the federal government, but those goals may be inferred 
from any collection of powers available to national 
222. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 544-45.
223. See id. at 536-37.
224. Id. at 546.
225. Id. at 547.
226. Id. at 548.
227. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 549.
228. Id. at 551-52.
229. Professor Magliocca has persuasively argued that it is best thought of as a new
standard.  See Magliocca, supra note 199, at 122 (“While Chief Justice Marshall’s landmark 
decision is credited with creating the framework that governs the scope of federal power, the 
operative standard really comes from the Legal Tender Cases decided following the Civil 
War.”). 
230. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 531 (“[T]he judiciary should presume,
until the contrary is clearly shown, that there has been no transgression of power by 
Congress—all the members of which act under the obligation of an oath of fidelity to the 
Constitution.”). 
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governments;231 (2) the means chosen by Congress must be 
reasonable, but might only be indirect moves toward those 
penumbral goals;232 and (3) a constitutional prohibition would 
limit Congress, but the Constitution would have to explicitly spell 
it out for it to be effective.233  In short, the Court altered each of 
the three parts of the McCulloch test; under this new version, it is 
difficult to imagine that any power claimed by a majority of the 
members of Congress may be found unconstitutional.234 
Almost completely absent from Justice Strong’s opinion is 
any role for the Founding Fathers or the generation that ratified 
the Constitution.  Indeed, his only real observation about those 
people is the rather startling conclusion that they must have been 
aware that “emergencies might arise when the precious metals 
(then more scarce than now) might prove inadequate to the 
necessities of the government and the demands of the people.”235  
In other words, the founding generation must have realized that 
sometimes the nation would run short of specie and would simply 
have to print notes and declare them to be legal tender for all 
debts, public and private.  Why that generation did not create a 
slightly less opaque way of providing for this crisis that they saw 
looming is a mystery that Justice Strong chose not to solve for us. 
Justice Bradley’s concurrence offered a slightly more 
limited, but no more originalist, perspective on the problem.236  
For although Justice Bradley seemed to take a sweeping, organic 
view of federal power similar to that later espoused by Justice 
Holmes,237 he did attempt to cabin the majority decision 
231. Id. at 534.
232. See id. at 536 (“[T]he whole history of the government and of congressional
legislation has exhibited the use of a very wide discretion . . . in the selection of the necessary 
and proper means to carry into effect the great objects for which the government was framed 
. . . .”). 
233. Id. at 531 (noting that to find a law in violation of the Constitution, proponents
must show a clear violation and not merely raise a doubt). 
234. This was not lost on the dissenters, who lamented the loss of limited government.
See id. at 633 (Clifford, J., dissenting) (insisting that for the Court to ignore the meaning of 
the limited powers delegated to Congress was “to establish a new Constitution or to do for 
the people what they have not chosen to do for themselves”). 
235. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 546 (Bradley, J., concurring).
236. See id. at 554-70.
237. Compare id. at 555 (“The United States is not only a government, but it is a
National government . . . . It has jurisdiction over all those general subjects . . . which affect 
the interests of the whole people equally . . . .”), with Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 
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somewhat by grounding it in the emergency conditions of the 
day.238  Without ever varying significantly from the majority’s 
analysis, he asserted that the context of that analysis was an 
existential threat to the United States.239  Giving paper money 
legal tender status was merely incidental to its printing, he noted 
reassuringly.240  It was certainly not a radical act, “like the coinage 
of leather or ivory or kowrie shells.”241  It was merely a traditional 
note—a pledge that could be redeemed in specie at some future 
date.242  “No one supposes,” he predicted (inaccurately), “that 
these government certificates are never to be paid—that the day 
of specie payments is never to return.”243 
For Justice Bradley, this issuance of what seemed to be 
merely promissory notes—and certainly not an attempt to “make 
dollars” out of paper—had proven vital to the survival of the 
Republic.244  This power was only small, and nonthreatening, but 
nonetheless would not “be resorted to except upon extraordinary 
and pressing occasions, such as war.”245  He seemed confident in 
his prediction that things would soon return to normal.  They 
would not. 
Unlike Justice Strong, Justice Bradley did exhibit some 
concern for the experiences of the generation that framed the 
Constitution.  He noted the experiments during the Revolutionary 
War, and paused to share Benjamin Franklin’s observation that 
the depreciation of paper money would reduce the public debt by 
(1920) (quoting Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 33 (1903)) (“[I]t is not lightly to be 
assumed that, in matters requiring national action, ‘a power which must belong to and 
somewhere reside in every civilized government’ is not to be found. “).  
238. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 567 (Bradley, J., concurring) (“[T]he
power to make treasury notes a legal tender . . . is nevertheless a power not to be resorted to 
except upon extraordinary and pressing occasions.”). 
239. Justice Bradley did deny that this was limited to wartime, though.  Id. (refusing
to limit the source of legal tender authority to the war power as “other public exigencies may 
arise in the history of a nation which may make it expedient and imperative to exercise it”). 
240. Id. at 560.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 561.  Of course, the day of specie
payments has never returned.  See generally Jacob Goldstein & David Kestenbaum, Why We 
Left the Gold Standard, NPR: PLANET MONEY (Apr. 21, 2011), [https://perma.cc/57W5-
ZC44]. 
244. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 561 (Bradley, J., concurring).
245. Id. at 567.
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the very act of depreciating.246  Remarkably, his survey of the pre-
constitutional experiences of paper money led him to conclude 
that the decision to make paper a legal tender was “always a 
question for the legislative discretion.”247  After this 
astonishing—and unconvincing—review of the founding 
generation, he returned to his present, prudentialist framework.  
Here he concluded that the broad power at issue was necessary to 
prevent the “heart of the nation” from being “crushed out.”248 
The four dissenters could not have agreed less with this 
proposition.  Between them, they offered three distinct 
dissents.249  All cover much of the same ground, but they share 
the sentiment expressed by the Chief Justice that the new result 
was merely the product of having new Justices on the Court.250  
The remaining members of the previous year’s majority, who now 
“find themselves in a minority on the court,” were utterly 
unpersuaded by the decision.251  Chief Justice Chase then walked 
again the ground he had trod in Hepburn, applying McCulloch 
and finding the law wanting.252  Indeed, he assured the country 
“[r]eflection has only wrought a firmer belief in the soundness of 
the constitutional doctrines maintained, and in the importance of 
them to the country.”253 
Chief Justice Chase rejected “wholly” Justice Strong’s 
aggregate powers argument.254  Not only was this idea, that 
constitutional grants of authority emanated powers beyond their 
words, “advanced for the first time” in this case, but the 
acceptance of such a doctrine, the Chief Justice claimed, would 
alter the entire system.255  That idea, plus the idea that Congress 
246. Id. at 557.
247. Id. at 558.
248. Id. at 564.
249. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 570, 587, 634 (Chase, C.J., Clifford &
Field, JJ., dissenting). 
250. Id. at 572, 634 (Chase, C.J. & Field J., dissenting).
251. Id. at 572 (Chase, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the four Justices might be a
minority but that “[t]heir convictions, however, remain unchanged.”) 
252. Id. at 572-74.
253. Id. at 572.
254. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 582.
255. Id.
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could judge the necessity of its acts, made the federal government 
“practically absolute and unlimited.”256  
Chief Justice Chase also focused on the means chosen by 
Congress as the most troubling part of the test.  He found “no 
connection” between the power to coin money and the ability to 
make paper a legal tender.257  Indeed, he found the law to be not 
just illegitimate but actually counterproductive.  He argued that 
the making of the paper as legal tender showed the government to 
be weak, as an admission by the United States that people would 
otherwise not accept them.258  
Returning to his argument that both the letter and spirit of 
the Constitution forbade the action, Chief Justice Chase again 
sought the high ground of originalism.  He noted Madison’s 
agreement in removing the ban on the federal power to issue notes 
because he understood that such notes might have some utility, 
but they simply could not be made a legal tender.259  He found a 
similar rejection of the scourge of paper money in the absence of 
such a power in the Federalist Papers,260 and in Daniel Webster’s 
confident assertion that only silver and gold could constitute a 
legal tender.261  
Justice Clifford added his voice to that of the Chief Justice, 
and spoke even more directly from an originalist perspective.262  
The founding generation, he reminded listeners, knew “from 
bitter experience” the “calamitous effects” of using paper as a 
legal tender.263  He tracked the early experiences of the young 
constitutional republic to demonstrate that none of the early 
Congresses had acted as if they had this power.264  He even 
reached into the period before the Constitution, a time that was 
important because it was when “all America had come to the 
256. Id.
257. Id. at 574.
258. Id. at 579 (noting that by mandating acceptance of the greenbacks, the United
States “virtually declares that it does not expect them to be received without compulsion.  It 
practically represents itself insolvent”). 
259. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 585 (arguing that removing the ability
to emit bills of credit “cut off the pretext for a paper currency”). 
260. Id.
261. Id. at 586.
262. See id. at 589-95 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 589.
264. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 590-95.
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conclusion that all the paper currency in circulation was utterly 
worthless, and that nothing was fit for a standard of value but gold 
and silver coin.”265  He thus found a consistent view of the 
question from that critical generation, noting that acts of Congress 
before the Constitution and just after it aligned with the 
Convention itself; none were interested in allowing the paper 
money experiment of the Revolution to be repeated.266  He found 
a consistency, too, in Framers who had a wide variety of opinions 
in other areas.  He quoted Madison,267 he quoted Ellsworth,268 he 
even quoted Hamilton.269  He found that the seventy years that 
had passed between then and now showed no act by any member 
of any body of the government that “affords the slightest support” 
to the theory embraced by the majority.270  This was true even 
though those decades witnessed “two foreign wars, the creation 
of the second national bank, and the greatest financial revulsions 
through which our country has ever passed.”271 
It was this intent of the Framers that mattered, Justice 
Clifford argued in his own dissent, not the convenience or even 
necessity of the particular action.272  To argue that somehow 
powers merely implied by the war power created such authority 
was “a mere waste of words.”273  Congress had the power to 
collect taxes, borrow money, and sell public lands; those would 
surely be enough.274 
Justice Clifford also directly refuted the majority’s notion 
that Hepburn was suspect because it was the product of a less than 
full Court.275  Like the Chief Justice, Justice Clifford reminded 
265. Id. at 595.
266. Id. at 596-98.
267. Id. at 607 (citing Madison for the idea that prohibiting bills of credit would serve
to prevent “making the bills a tender, either for public or private debts”). 
268. Id. at 606 (quoting the future Chief Justice as hoping that the ban on bills of credit
would “shut and bar the door against paper money”). 
269. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 608 (citing Hamilton’s opposition to
paper money because the government should not be trusted with “so seducing and dangerous 
an element”). 
270. Id. at 610.
271. Id. at 629.
272. Id. at 633.
273. Id. at 630.
274. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 630-31 (stating that to suggest
those methods were insufficient was “a mere chimera”). 
275. See id. at 604.
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the majority that the Court had been legislatively reduced to 
eight,276 and that five of those eight had agreed with the Framers 
that paper money could not be a legal tender.277  
Unafraid to travel ground already at least partially covered 
by his colleagues, Justice Field offered a separate dissent as 
well.278  Bringing his own distinctive voice to the controversy, 
Justice Field went beyond merely citing Hepburn to praising it by 
claiming that no previous case had been “more fully argued or 
more maturely considered.”279  He then proceeded to calmly work 
through a number of styles of constitutional analysis, finding the 
majority’s decision hopelessly flawed in every one. 
As a textualist, Justice Field argued that the issuing of 
greenbacks as currency was perfectly legitimate.280  He found that 
it stemmed from the borrowing power, “which is granted to 
Congress without limitation.”281  But he denied that this power 
would ever allow the government to make the paper currency thus 
printed legal tender for private debts.282  The power to borrow 
given to the federal government, he argued, was the same as any 
individual’s ability to borrow.283  As no individual could dictate 
the terms of third-party relationships, the borrowing power of the 
federal government could not logically support the legal tender 
designation.284  He then dismissed quickly the other claimed 
sources of power: “to declare war, to suppress insurrection, to 
raise and support armies, and to provide and maintain a navy.”285  
He saw the Civil War as having increased the need for funds, but 
not the powers vested in Congress, concluding that “[t]he wants 
276. The legislative reduction of the Court would not allow any new Justice to be
appointed until the number reached six.  Id. 
277. See id. at 599-600, 604.
278. Id. at 634 (Field, J., dissenting).
279. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 634.  By comparison, he obliquely
insulted the overturning majority, noting “I shall not comment upon the causes which have 
led to a reversal of that judgment.  They are patent to every one.”  Id. 
280. See id. at 635-36.
281. Id. at 635.
282. Id. at 638.
283. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 638.
284. See id. at 639 (arguing that nothing within the power to borrow allowed “that the
rights or interests of third parties, strangers to the matter, shall be in any respect affected”). 
285. Id. at 648.
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of the government can never be the measure of its powers.”286  He 
similarly rejected swiftly any claims that printing money could be 
subsumed under coining money, noting not only that coins must 
have intrinsic value, but also that the counterfeiting clause 
allowed Congress to criminalize both the falsifying of coins and 
securities.287 
As a structuralist, he denied that Congress even had the 
factual power to make paper money a legal tender, at least as to 
its face value.288  He cited “the universal law of currency” that 
what determined the worth of paper money was not a dictate of 
the law but “the confidence which the parties receiving the notes 
had in their ultimate payment.”289  He cited not only the 
Revolutionary War examples, but also the more recent experience 
of the Civil War itself, when the value of the greenbacks 
fluctuated not according to acts of Congress but rather to 
battlefield successes and setbacks of the Union army.290  Indeed, 
he argued that a test of utility would lead to a Congress of 
unlimited power, as the greenbacks could be made successful by 
an act of Congress providing that “the notes of the government 
should serve as a free ticket in the public conveyances of the 
country.”291  He noted that no advocate would concede the 
appropriateness of that.292  He further argued that the structural 
choice to extend an express bankruptcy power to Congress 
demonstrated the lack of a more general power to interfere with 
private contracts in the way made inevitable by the legal tender 
declaration.293 
Justice Field even engaged the majority on its preferred 
ground of prudentialism. While the Court had insisted that 
making paper money a legal tender was something that had to be 
286. Id. at 648-49.
287. Id. at 649-50.
288. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 643-44.
289. Id. at 644.
290. Id. at 646 (“[T]he notes of the United States issued under the Legal Tender Act
rose in value in the market as the successes of our arms gave evidence of an early termination 
of the war, and that they fell in value with every triumph of the Confederate forces.”). 
291. Id. at 643.
292. Id. (harkening back to McCulloch, he noted that not even an “advocate of the most
liberal construction” would suggest that such an act “would be appropriate as a means to the 
execution of the power to borrow”). 
293. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 663 .
708 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  73:4 
done for the benefit of the nation, Justice Field invoked “the 
demoralizing tendency, the cruel injustice, and the intolerable 
oppression of a paper currency.”294  Coupled with the suggestion 
that the real success of the greenbacks was attributable solely to 
military success, he argued that there was no good reason for 
sustaining the claim of power on such utilitarian grounds.295 
Where Justice Field was at his most powerful, though, was 
in his use of a historical, originalist modality.  He cited a Hall of 
Fame of voices from the Constitutional Convention, men such as 
Morris,296 Ellsworth,297 Butler,298 and Madison himself.299  He 
even foresaw Judge Harold Leventhal’s much noted observation 
that citing to legislative history was “akin to ‘looking over a 
crowd and picking out your friends.’”300  Justice Field 
acknowledged that “opinions and intentions of individual 
members of the Convention . . . are not to control the construction 
of the plain language.”301  Yet he could not help but note that 
although “opposite opinions on many points were expressed” in 
other areas, that was not true on the paper as legal tender 
question.302  Here, on the contrary, there was unanimity not only 
in the convention itself but “in the several State conventions and 
in the discussions before the people.”303  From this uniformity of 
thought, plus the three-quarter century of practice since,304 he 
concluded that to set aside such evidence of the intention of the 
294. Id. at 652-53.
295. Id. at 653 (claiming that the precious metal “ever has been and always must be
recognized by the world as the true standard” and only that could “facilitate commerce, 
protect industry, establish justice, and prevent the possibility of a recurrence of the evils” 
brought on by paper money in the Revolutionary era). 
296. Id. at 653-54 (noting that it was Morris’s motion to strike the power to “emit bills
on the credit of the United States”). 
297. Id. at 654 (quoting Ellsworth’s confidence that “[p]aper money can in no case be
necessary”). 
298. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 654 (who observed that “paper was a
legal tender in no country in Europe”). 
299. Id. at 654-55.
300. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the
1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983). 
301. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 655.
302. Id. at 656.
303. Id.
304. Id.  Field noted not only the practice—or lack thereof—of using paper money as
legal tender since ratification of the Constitution, but also cited the opinions of members of 
the post-framing Hall of Fame such as Daniel Webster.  See id. at 659.  
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framing generation “would require very clear evidence.”305  No 
such evidence appeared in the majority opinion. 
As he concluded with a despairing pledge to obey the 
Constitution306 amid warnings that Congress now could use this 
“constructive power”307 to subject the nation to its “unrestrained 
will,”308 it is possible that Justice Field hoped that the damage 
might yet be contained.  After all, the majority had at least hinted 
that the legal tender power grew from the crisis of war, and thus 
might not last forever.309 
That any such hope was in vain was made plain almost a 
decade and a half later.  Less than a generation after Mrs. Lee 
received paper money for her lost sheep, the controversy appeared 
one last time in the Supreme Court.  In the 1884 case of Juilliard 
v. Greenman the paper money issue ended with barely a
whimper.310
The scene was set by a change of Congressional minds.  In 
1875, as Reconstruction drew to an end, Congress concluded that 
the emergency caused by the war had come to an end.  It passed 
a law “to provide for the resumption of specie payments,” which 
would methodically remove the paper money from circulation.311  
Perhaps, as Justice Bradley had predicted, the emergency that 
required the government to issue legal tender notes was now past. 
Within three years, things had changed.  After severe 
disruptions of the kind predicted by the majority in Knox v. Lee, 
Congress replaced the 1875 act with one forbidding the retirement 
of paper money by requiring that that greenbacks traded in for 
coins “not be retired, canceled or destroyed, but they shall be 
reissued and paid out again and kept in circulation.”312  Any 
305. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 667.
306. Id. at 681 (he compared his loyalty to the Constitution to his Christianity, citing
“our great Master” for his requirement to keep his commandments). 
307. Id. at 666.
308. Id. at 664.
309. Id. at 540 (majority opinion) (“[A] consideration of the time when they were
enacted, and of the circumstances in which the government then stood, is important.”). 
Additionally, Justice Bradley’s concurrence had made this explicit.  See Legal Tender Cases, 
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 561 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
310. Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884).
311. Id. at 436-37 (quoting Specie Payment Resumption Act, ch. 15, 18 Stat. 296
(1875)). 
312. Id. at 437 (quoting Act of May 31, 1878, ch. 146, 20 Stat. 87).
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language in Knox that was tentative or linked to the war power 
was now to be tested.313 
The Court yawned.  The eight-Justice majority, after noting 
that all nine agreed that Knox controlled, proceeded to apply the 
extremely deferential version of the McCulloch test that had been 
featured in the Knox case.314  The power to borrow money, the 
majority held, amply justified the means of making paper as legal 
tender.315  Indeed, the Court noted, any determination of when 
such a means was appropriate was “a political question, to be 
determined by Congress.”316 
In one breathtaking display, the majority went significantly 
further than the Knox Court had.  After emphasizing the powers 
of Congress that arose from the absence of the term “expressly” 
in the Tenth Amendment’s limitation of powers,317 the Court 
reexamined the framing of the Constitution.318  Justice Gray 
acknowledged that “[s]ome of the members of the Convention . . . 
expressed the strongest opposition to paper money.”319  He 
nonetheless made the astonishing claim that the notes of the 
Constitutional Convention “afford no proof of any general 
concurrence of opinion upon the subject before us.”320  Turning 
back to the removal of the “emit bills” section of the borrowing 
power and Madison’s claim that it prevented paper being used as 
legal tender, Justice Gray took Madison to task for not explaining 
why that would be so.321  Finding evidence in the absence of 
evidence, he then noted that “it cannot be known how many of the 
other delegates, by whose vote the motion was adopted, intended 
neither to proclaim nor to deny the power to emit paper 
313. That test was, in the words of Professor Fairman, “contrived.”  FAIRMAN, supra
note 171, at 771.  He noted that the case was orchestrated by opposing members of Congress, 
Benjamin Butler and Simeon Chittenden, coordinating a cotton sale between citizens of 
different states, with the amount of the sale having been designed to be just over the Supreme 
Court’s then-existing jurisdiction limit.  Id. at 771-72. 
314. Juilliard, 110 U.S. at 438.
315. Id. at 449.
316. Id. at 450.
317. Id. at 442.
318. Id.
319. Juilliard, 110 U.S. at 443.
320. Id.
321. Id.
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money.”322  As one could not know whether the prohibition on 
state issue of paper money was meant to deny Congress that 
power,323 and as European countries were now “universally 
understood” to have that power as an aspect of sovereignty,324 it 
was available to Congress. 
Although he was now alone, Justice Field fought on.  His 
dissent offered little that was new.  He insisted that on this point 
the intentions of the Framers were known “with moral 
certainty.”325  He rejected the comparison to European nations as 
irrelevant to a Constitution providing for a limited federal 
government.326  He denounced as evil the “fraud, chicanery, and 
profligacy” of paper money in the pre-constitutional era.327  He 
fretted that the argument that this had been a necessary act of war 
was now forsaken and that what was once justified as “the 
‘medicine of the Constitution’ has now become its daily 
bread.”328 
Field made two ominous predictions.  One warned that there 
would now be no limit on the federal government: “why should 
there be any restraint upon unlimited appropriations by the 
government for all imaginary schemes of public improvement, if 
the printing press can furnish the money that is needed for 
them?”329  The other was that the paper money controversy would 
not go away, that it would “continue to come until it is settled so 
as to uphold and not impair the contracts of parties, to promote 
and not defeat justice.”330  That simply did not happen. 
322. Id.
323. Id. at 446.
324. Juilliard, 110 U.S. at 447.
325. Id. at 451 (Field, J., dissenting).
326. Id. at 467.
327. Id. at 452 (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES § 1371, at 268 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1883)). 
328. Id. at 458.
329. Juilliard, 110 U.S. at 470.
330. Id. at 451.
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VII. THE PEOPLE (TACITLY) SPEAK AGAIN: PAPER
MONEY IS CONSTITUTIONAL 
An external observer of the United States during the period 
of the Greenback cases might well have concluded that Justice 
Field was right, and that the struggle would end no time soon.  
The observer would be wrong.331  For although a battle would 
continue over paper money, it was a significantly different one 
that would captivate political movements for the next hundred 
years.  
The battle over the gold standard, pitting hard money 
interests against soft money interests, was certainly related to the 
legal tender battle.  The battle crossed and re-crossed party 
lines:332  President Grant, whose appointees saved paper money, 
later stated that he sought a repeal of the Legal Tender Act.333  
This statement, coupled with his veto of an 1874 bill to expand 
the supply of paper money, had the effect of an explosion that, in 
the view of one contemporary, threatened to destroy the 
Republican Party.334 
 But the underlying question, whether legal tender could be 
made of paper, was clearly settled.  Even the proponents of the 
gold standard assumed that the legal tender within the United 
States could be more than gold and silver.335  They recognized 
that battle to have been lost, and sought simply to avoid forfeiting 
even more ground to the soft money interests.336  The American 
people then, and ever since, have tacitly assented to this new—if 
unwritten—amendment to the Constitution: Congress may now, 
when it sees fit, issue paper currency and grant it the status of 
legal tender for all private debts.337 
Indeed, the brutally complete nature of paper money’s 
victory is visible in the remarks of one of the most famous 
331. FAIRMAN, supra note 171, at 774 (“Evils which Justice Field predicted did not
arise . . . .”).  
332. UNGER, supra note 117, at 172 (noting Democratic opposition to the Republican-
sponsored Legal Tender Act on constitutional grounds). 
333. Id. at 245.
334. Id. at 246.
335. See id. at 229-30.
336. See id. at 234.
337. See BERNARD H. SIEGAN, THE SUPREME COURT’S CONSTITUTION 27 (1987).
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defenders of originalism of the late twentieth century. When 
nominated to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Judge 
Robert Bork was already a fierce proponent of originalist ideas.338  
Nonetheless, even he recognized the limits of originalism in this 
context: “[s]cholarship suggests that the framers intended to 
prohibit paper money.  Any judge who today thought he would 
go back to the original intent really ought to be accompanied by 
a guardian rather than be sitting on a bench.”339  Setting aside the 
unnecessarily gentle term “suggests,” the problem with the 
originalist project appears in full force in this brief moment.  As 
noted earlier, few scholars of originalism have undertaken the 
project of defending paper money as legal tender; with the rare 
exception of authors like Professor Natelson,340 most have simply 
accepted it as a fait accompli, as Judge Bork did.341  But why 
should that be so?  Why, precisely, should a judge be committed 
to a guardianship for recognizing that the language of the 
Constitution, the intent of its authors, and the understanding of 
the people of its day all make clear that paper money is 
unacceptable?  Why should the will of Reconstruction-era 
Americans, which was never formalized through the Article V 
process, affect the meaning of the Constitution? 
CONCLUSION 
Assuming that Judge Bork was right to surrender Justice 
Field’s unsuccessful struggle, what lessons are available to the 
modern student of the Constitution?  Must we begin a quixotic 
crusade to undo a century and a half of fiscal reality?  If not, have 
we broken faith with our Constitution?  Or does Madison offer us 
a way forward? 
One way to view the Constitution is as an operational 
document, one that gave birth to a living organism of 
338. Mark A. Graber, Robert Bork, the Original Originalist, BALT. SUN (Dec. 24,
2012), [https://perma.cc/C436-WFBK]. 
339. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 113 (1989) 
[hereinafter Bork Nomination] (statement of J. Robert Bork, nominee). 
340. See supra note 46.
341. Bork Nomination, supra note 339, at 113.
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governance.342  The life of that government has resulted in 
changes to it and not all of those are contained in formal 
amendments to the birth document.343  If James Madison was 
right that the tacit assent of the people solves the Jeffersonian 
problem of rule by the dead, that assent must provide a place for 
unwritten amendments.  Such amendments, ratified by the 
behavior of generations of Americans, demonstrate their 
consent.344  Such amendments and alterations cannot be removed 
by an originalist project designed to restore features put aside by 
today’s United States, at least if republicanism is to have meaning 
for the living.  To insist otherwise is to remove any current 
relevance of the idea of consent of the governed. 
There is little doubt that the Constitution does not textually 
provide the power to make paper money into legal tender.  There 
is little doubt that the drafters of the Constitution intended to 
prevent paper money from gaining the status of legal tender.  
There is little doubt that the original public meaning of the 
document, followed for generations thereafter, concurred.  But 
when the needs of the Civil War demanded a solution that could 
be offered by precisely this legal tender designation, the 
government granted it.  The people consented.  When the 
Supreme Court initially rejected this unwritten amendment to the 
written Constitution, the people treated it as a temporary 
aberration.  Their patience was rewarded a year later, when the 
Court reversed itself and acceded to the demands of the nation.  
That decision the country accepted.  More importantly, the people 
of the United States today show their continued assent with every 
paper money private transaction they make.  That fact 
demonstrates the remarkably long-lasting level of consent to this 
unwritten change to the Constitution. 
Thomas Jefferson warned us that the dead had no right to 
exercise control over the living.345  James Madison noted in  
342. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (“[W]hen we are dealing with
words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must 
realize that they have called into life a being . . . .”). 
343. See, e.g., Balkin & Levinson, Constitutional Change, supra note 26, at 497-98.
344. See Madison, supra note 14, at 24.
345. Jefferson, supra note 9, at 395-96.
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response that the living might well avoid the chaos of anarchy by 
granting their consent tacitly to the structures erected by the dead 
by continuing to use them.346  The wisdom of both of these men 
demonstrates the lasting value of the legal tender cases and the 
fundamental flaw in originalism.  The continuing consent of a 
century and a half of practice have ratified the Civil War 
amendment that granted an unwritten power to Congress, 
validating a power over legal tender that would have horrified the 
authors and ratifiers of the Constitution.  To set aside the 
generations of consent, including current consent, in favor of 
restoring the original meaning of the document is to denigrate the 
very idea of republicanism.  Even if the project of originalism to 
eliminate unwritten amendments was attainable, the commitment 
to the consent of the governed would stand in its way. 
346. See Madison, supra note 14, at 24.
